The institutional character of computerized information systems

We examine how important social and technical choices become part of the history of a computer-based information system (CB/SJ and embedded in the social structure which supports its development and use. These elements of a CBIS can be organized in specific ways to enhance its usability and performance. Paradoxically, they can also constrain future implementations and post-implementations.We argue that CBIS developed from complex, interdependent social and technical choices should be conceptualized in terms of their institutional characteristics, as well as their information-processing characteristics. The social system which supports the development and operation of a CBIS is one major element whose institutional characteristics can effectively support routine activities while impeding substantial innovation. Characterizing CBIS as institutions is important for several reasons: (1) the usability of CBIS is more critical than the abstract information-processing capabilities of the underlying technology; (2) CBIS that are well-used and have stable social structures are more difficult to replace than those with less developed social structures and fewer participants; (3) CBIS vary from one social setting to another according to the ways in which they are organized and embedded in organized social systems. These ideas are illustrated with the case study of a failed attempt to convert a complex inventory control system in a medium-sized manufacturing firm

COMPUTER SYSTEMS AS INSTITUTIONS: SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF COMPUTING IN ORGANIZATIONS

This paper introduces terminology and develops a framework for incorporating and emphasizing important social and political choices that become part of the history of Computer-Based Information Systems (CBIS) and are embedded in the social structure which supports its development and use. These social and political elements of a CBIS are not just discrete elements in an environment. They can be organized in specific ways which may enhance usability and performance and, paradoxically, constrain implementations and post-implementations. It is argued argue that CBIS, developed from complex, interdependent social and technical choices are better conceptualized as institutions than as tools. The distinction between tools and institutions is important for several reasons: the usability of CBIS is the critical factor, not the technology itself; CBIS that are well-used and have stable social structures are more difficult to replace than those with less social structure and fewer participants; and CBIS vary from one social sctting to another according to the ways in which they are organized and embedded in organized social systems

Knowledge Barriers to Diffusion of Telemedicine

Telemedicine is one proposed solution to problems of accessibility, quality, and costs of medical care. Although telemedicine applications have proliferated in recent years, their diffusion has remained low in terms of the volume of consultations. In this study, Attewell’s (1992) theory of knowledge barriers is extended to explain why diffusion of telemedicine remains low. In case studies of telemedicine programs in three world- renowned medical centers in Boston, Massachusetts, we find that, in addition to technical knowledge barriers, as suggested by Attewell, there are economic, organizational, and behavioral knowledge barriers that inhibit the diffusion of telemedicine. The lowering of these barriers entails intensive learning efforts by proponents of applications within adopter organizations. They need to develop technically feasible, medically valid, reimbursable, and institutionally supported applications in order to justify the value of telemedicine and engender frequent and consistent use by physicians

Entrepreneur Or Intermediary: The Nature of the Relationship Manager\u27s Job

A new liaison role between Information Systems (IS) and users, the relationship manager (RM), has recently emerged.Accordingtotheprescriptiveliterature,RMsaddvaluebydeepunderstanding ofthebusinessestheyserve and technologyleadership. Little is known, however, about their actual work practices. Is the RM an intermediary, filtering information and sometimes misinformation, from clients to IS, or do they play more pivotal roles as entrepreneurs and change agents? This article addresses these questions by studying four RMs in four different industries. The RMs were studied using the structured observation methodology employed by Mintzberg (CEOs), Ives and Olson (MIS managers), and Stephens et al. (CIOs). The findings suggest that while RMs spend less time communicating with users than one would expect, they are leaders, often mavericks, in the entrepreneurial work practices necessary to build partnerships with clients and to make the IS infrastructure more responsive to client needs

Bridging the IS-Line Interface: The Role of the Relationship Manager

IS Organizations are increasingly focusing on managing the interface between themselves and their clients within organizations to improve not only the level of customer service but also the utilization of firm investments in hardware and software. Several organizations have recently created full-time specialized positions, often termed \u27Relationship Manager\u27 to manage the relationship between IS and Line groups. This paper presents the results of an exploratory study to understand the role of the \u27Relationship Manager\u27(RM) and how people in these positions deliver value to IS and Line groups in the organization. Our findings are that the role of the RMs is complex, requiring a focus on the coordination of activities across the IS-Line interface in the short run while marshaling organizational energy towards initiatives that position the firm favorably in the medium and long term. Combining an intimate knowledge of the organization with expertise in IT, the RMs utilize their influential positions in the informal network within the firm to create and capitalize on opportunities to champion innovation and enable change

Rob Kling: A Remembrance

This article presents a remembrance of Rob Kling, a long-time intellectual leader in IS by three colleagues who worked closely with him

IMPLEMENTING DESKTOP COMPUTING, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND QUALITY OF WORKLIFE

This article presents preliminary findings from a three year longitudinal study on the role of desktop computing in the work of 38 work groups that have integrated computing significantly into their work lives. Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected from surveys and interviews. End-users\u27 participation in the process of implementing desktop computers in work groups is examined as a primary contributor to the quality of their work life, as is the available infrastructure (training, supplies, and consulting) to support computing in the work groups. Two primary implementation processes are examined: top-down and grass-roots: We discuss the quality of work life of computer users along five dimensions: participation in decisions about work, job complexity, expertise and involvement in computing, changes in job enrichment attributed to desktop computing, and changes in work effort attributed to desktop computing. The quality of working life is most improved in work groups that computerize with grass-roots processes and have adequate infrastructure to support their work with computing

The Politics of Efficiency The Mobilization of Computing in Organizations

Mostbehavioral studies of the social andinformationprocessingarchitectures of computerbased information systems (CBIS) focus on the early stages of their life cycles, their conception, design, adoption, and organizational implementation. Because of this focus on earlyperiodsinthelifecycleofCBIS, wearemostawareoftheorganizationaldramasinthese early stages. This article examinesone aspectofthe laterstages ina CBIS\u27 life cycle: theways in which organizational actors select and implement enhancements to existing CBIS. The implementation of computer-based information systems is not mechanical If implementing a new technologyenhancedaspects of worklife equally forallparticipants, allmight agree on implementation schedules, strategies, and use of the CBIS. However, CBIS implementations are often accompanied by disagreements and delays, and sometimes failures. There are two streams of research on information systems implementation: procedural analyses of implementation and studies of the political dimensions of implementation. This study builds on the political stream of information systems studies and organizational studies. The political studies of information systems implementation have traditionally focused on the early stages of implementation Readers mightassume thatonce a CBIS has been successfully implemented political elements are less central to its routine administration. We show how political campaigns can continue throughout the life of a CBIS and are equally critical in maintaining or shifting the balance of powen This paper explains the nature of political mobilization in some detail The primary data are drawn from an extensive case study of a medium sized manufacturing firm (PRINTCO) which operates a complex computerized inventory control system shared by several departments. We also show how the organization of a CBIS does not simply evolve; rather, key actors shape the developmental trajectory of the organization of computing. (A developmental trajectory for a system is a sequence of social and technical configurations through which it has developed and a sequence of future configurations) Usually there is a range of variation in future sequences, and different groups may prefer different developmental trajectories. Inordertogaincontroloverthedevelopmentaltrajectory, keyactorsattempttocreatesetsof procedures and beliefs about the computing arrangements which other participants will accept as legitimate. These actors develop long-term strategies to mobilize support fortheir own preferences and to block the emergence of conflicting preferences. Participants in different work groups have different computing preferences which derive from their own lines of work. Subunits within an organization push for information system architectures and data access in forms which secure their own interests and enable control or significant influence over others. At any given time the infrastructure for providing computing services is structured, but not for everyone\u27s simultaneous convenience. (Infrastructure refers toresources and procedures which support the efficient use of some focal computing resource). It includes access to programmers, terminals, or appropriate computer- based reports; provision of training in system usage or programming languages; or participation in decision- making about appropriate procedures and priorities in system development Those groups which are successful indevelopingandmaintainingfavorablearrangementsamplifyexistingstructuresincrementalls Because computing resources are insufficient to meet all actor\u27s preferences simultaneosly, dominant coalitions can build powerby guidingthe development of a system to their own advantage and limiting other groups Theincremental developmentofa CBIS takes place overaperiod ofyearsratherthanweeks. The specific directioninwhichpowerfulactors guidea CBIS hasimportantconsequences for others inthe organizationinthatsome groups willbe betterservedthanothers. Overtimethe organization of the system becomes a taken- for-granted way of managing and coordinating workactivities. Asfinancialandideological commitments areincurred,itmaybecometoo costly to radically alter its developmental trajectory. We identifytwo key aspects of campaigns for computing: (1) a structural dimension, and (2) an ideological dimension. The structural dimension refers to the standardized arrangements for providing computing services (e. g., the infrastructure) and the process by which they become woven into organizational life and institutionalized. The ideological dimension focuses attention on the articulation of a world view which takes on meaning in the social worldofan organization.Key actors seeklegitimacy fortheircampaigns by convincingothers that their world view makes sense. In the paper we describe selected strategies key actors use to mobilize support for their preferences and to quiet opposition. The struggles for contzol might be perverse if power and control were the only issues. At PRINTCO we found that a coalition of manufacturing managers coupled their initiatives for control with material policies that could improve organizational efficienci However, efficiency was not the only issue since these manufacturing managers did not engage in many varied experiments to improve material efficiencies. They engaged in a relatively narrow array of strategies largely tied to their computerized inventory control system. The language of efficiency was both real and an acceptable rationale for leveraging organizational influence. Manyorganizationshavenowlivedwithseveralsuccessivegenerationsofthe same kindof CBIS. By common standards of successful implementation, the computerized inventory control system atPRINTCO was adequately implemented. The company was also successfulin growing rapidly and reaping good profits. The computerized inventory control system was heavilyused for sixyears, centraltothe operations ofthe organization, andthe subjectof tremendous continuing commitment However, its operation was not smooth, and its enhancement was the subject of several failed initiatives, including a major software conversion. It did not evolve. A coalition of manufacturing managers tried to move the system, and the associated computing environment along a particular developmental trajectory. Their efforts were embodied in a series of campaigns which gave continuing life to the computerized inventory control system. This coalition dominated the local computing environment, but had neither perfectinformationnottotal control Some oftheir campaign strategies failed Inone period, they released substantial control over computing resources through a local micro-revolutioni but rapidly regained control when they appreciated its scale. The paper explains how key actors developed a variety of structural and ideological strategies to mobilize support for the arrangements they preferred and to quiet opposition. These structural arrangements became institutionalized; they were taken for granted and fit together in a mutually reinforcing complex. CBIS live and develop through the energies of their promoters rather than evolve through a life of their own